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CRIME PATTERNS
CHAPTER 9 THE ANTI-GANG INITIATIVE IN DETROIT
As with manyotherurbanareas,thehistoryof drugsandgangsin Detroit isin-
timatelytiedto its economicdevelopment.In hisbook DangerousSociety,Carl
Taylor (1990)providesan interestingand detailedinsightinto the evolution
of gangsin Detroit. During theindustrialboom of theearly 1900sto themid-
1930s,manyimmigrantswereattractedto thelure of quality,well-payingfac-
tory jobs. As immigrantsmovedinto the city in greaternumbers,neighbor-
hoods were establishedalong ethnic lines. The earliestgangsin Detroit can
be tracedto the dynamicsof theseethnic neighborhoodswhere loosegroups
of youthbandedtogetherto "protect" localmerchantsandneighborhoodresi-
dentsfrom outsiders.One such group thatwas formedprimarily to protect
Jewish merchants,the SugarHouse Gang, eventuallyjoined forceswith an-
otherDetroit groupto reapthefinancialrewardsassociatedwith distillingop-
erationsand other organizedcrime activities.Startingin the 1920sthis new
gang,the Purple Gang,)representedone of Detroit'sfIrSttrue organizedgang
syndicates.
Many African Americansmigratedfrom theruralSouth to Detroit during
the 1940sand 1950s.Like manyEuropeanethnicgroups,African Americans
wereattractedby thepromiseof well-payingfactoryjobs. There were almost
immediatelytensionsbetweenthegrowing blackpopulationand"vhites.Afri-
canAmericansweregenerallyrestrictedto living in afewneighborhoodsin the
easternsideof thecity,andmanyfound it difficultto gainqualityemployment.
Growing tensionsanddistrusteventuallyresultedin tworiotsthatwould change
Detroit forever.
Detroit'scrime trendsshow a mixed pattern.While the levelsof somemajor
crimeshaveattenuatedin the pastseveralyears,the decline hasnot been as




Table9.1 detailschangesin Detroit'scrimebetween1995and 1999.2Data
reflectboth the totalnumberof reportedcrimesin eachcrime category,and
crime ratesper 100,000.ConsideringDetroit'sdecliningpopulationin recent
years,it is importantto considerboth of thesefigures.Detroit experiencedan
overalldecreasein homicidesbetween1995and1999.The 453homicidesre-
cordedin 1999representanapproximately16percentdecreaseoverthe 1995
total,substantiallylower (34percent)thanthe 689reportedin 1987(Michigan
StatePolice, 1988).Althoughhomicideshavedecreasedramaticallyin Detroit,
thehomiciderate,47per100,000,remainssubstantiallyhigherthanthenational











The city of Detroit is locatedin the southeastregion of Michigan. With its
highly developedtransportationinfrastructureandproximity to Canadaand
Chicago, it hasfunctionedasa key centerin themanufacturingindustry for
nearlyone hundred years.Detroit's population, 1,027,974in 1990and esti-
matedto bejust lessthana million in 2000,hasbeensteadilydecreasingfrom
its1970populationof 1,511,336.Demographicdatafromthe1990censusindi-
catedthat76 percentof Detroit'spopulationis Mrican American and22 per-
cent is white (U.S. Departmentof Housing andUrban Development,2000).
Datafrom theDepartmentof HousingandUrbanDevelopment(HUD) in-
dicatesimportantandtroublingtrendsin thesocioeconomicstatusof Detroit's
residents.Despiteadeclinein Detroit'sestimatedpovertyratebetween1993and
1995,1the figureremainedmore thandoublethe1969rateof 14.7.Addition-
ally,in 1989approximately40 percentof Detroit'spopulationwasconsidered
low income, and only 11 percentwasconsideredhigh income. The number
consideredlow incomewasdouble the 1969figureof approximately20 per-
cent. Ivlost alarming,the medianadjustedfamily income in 1998dollarsde-
creasedfrom a high of nearly$45,000in 1969to approximately$30,000in
1989.These datasuggestaneconomicdeclinetook placein Detroit during the
1970sand1980s.Most of theeconomicdownturnwasassociatedwith thedra-
maticdeclinein manufacturing,especiallythatrelatedto theauto industry.
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GANGS IN DETROIT
Two raceriots in Detroit, in 1943and1967,havehadasignificantimpact
on thenatureof racerelationsin thecity.The riot of 1943,causedmostlyby
overcrowdedconditions,4segregation,andracism(Farley,Danziger,andHol-
zer,2000;McGraw, 1999),did little to changethe economicsituationof Afri-
canAmericans.In the post-World War II period Detroit's economyboomed.
During thewar, factoryworkerswerepaidgenerouslyand,becausetherewas
a lack of durablegoodsproduction,theyusuallysaveda good portion of their
wages.This, in conjunctionwith the growth in the nationalhighwaysystem,
causeda majorboom in automanufacturing.However, little wasdoneto in-
corporateAfrican Americansin theensuingeconomicwindfall. A laterriot in
July of1967 resultedin adramaticwithdrawalof manyof thebusinessesandin-
dustriesthatwereinstrumentalto Detroit'seconomy.
The Emergence of "Organized" Gangs
In the early 1970sseveralsocialchangesoccurredsimultaneouslythatsetthe
stagefor aproliferationof streetgangsin thecity.Detroit'seconomy,alongwith
thatof severalother Michigan citiessuchasFlint and Saginaw,sufferedfrom
tremendouscutbacksin the auto industrycausedby the oil embargoand in-
creasedcompetitionfrom Asianautomanufacturers.Around this sameperiod,
a highly addictivedrug,heroin, invadedDetroit'slocal drug markets.
As traditionalsocialcontrolserodedanddrug use increased,a delinquent
subculturestartedto pervademanyoncestableneighborhoods.Between1971
and 1975looselyaffiliatedgroupsof youthstartedto identifythemselveswith
streetnames.According to Taylor (1990),thesegangs,which he refersto as
"scavenger"gangs,were composedof misfits.sThe daysofloose1yorganized
gangsdid notlastfor long. Startingaround1975,gangsbegantoorganize,espe-
ciallyon theeastsideof Detroit. The Errol FlynnsandtheBlack Killers (BKs),6
two of themostrecognizableorganizedgangs,weredifferentiatedby theirstyl-
ishclothes(Taylor1990:22).In 1979,allegedlywith $80,000from aninsurance
payoutfor a murderedparent,t\voyoungmenin their 20sstartedYoung Boys
. Incorporated(YBI), a gangthatwould eventuallytakeovertheheroin andco-
caineindustryin Detroit.7This gangdifferedtremendouslyfrom othergangs
in thatmembersintentionallyrecruitedyoung boys to serveasstreetdealers
in their lucrativeoperation.Youngerjuvenileswere recruitedto avoidthe in-
creasinglypunitivesanctionsimposedon adultsby criminal courts.
Using thepseudonymof Gang C-l for thegangpresumedto bethe noto-
riousYoung Boys Incorporated,Taylor (1990) revealedseveralimportantchar-
acteristicsof thisgroup thatclearlydelineatedit from othersin Detroit. First,
theganghadextensiveoperationsthatwerecarriedout 24 hoursa day,7 days
a week.The operationswereso extensiveandelaboratethatthe gangactually
employedon-call legaladvice.Second,the gangactivelyrecruitedteenmem-
berswith promisesof financialreward,andeventuallybeganto competewith
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mainstreamemployersfor "qualitypersonnel."Third, gangmemberseventu-
ally becamecelebritiesin the city,which increasedtheattractivenessof their
organization.YBI's reachbecamesoextensive,atonepoint"employing"hun-
dredsof Detroit'syouththatit begantoundermineseveralfundamentalinstitu-
tions in thecity.For example,thelure of high-stakesfinancial"rewardsdimin-
ishedtheperceivedneedfor education.
A secondandequallynotoriousdrug organizationdevelopedduring the
sametime.Althoughnot organizedasastreetgangperse,thedrugenterprises
organizedby theChambersbrothersremainimportantexamplesof thelevelof
organizationin thedmgindustryfrom thelate1970suntil thelate1980s.Billy
Joeand LarryChambers,twoyoungmenwho grewup in abjectpovertyin ru-
ral Arkansas,foundedtwo interrelateddrug organizationsthat,accordingto
federalindictments,would eventuallygrossalmost$3 million per day.William




andoperatedout of approximately10differentlocations.The levelof organi-
zationin theenterprisewasdetailedto thepointwheretherewereformalpro-
ceduresfor processingpayrollandestablishedorganizationalrules,alongwith
accompanying"fines"for failureto comply.For example,aposterfoundatone
locationidentifiedthe"finefor stealingamongthegroupto be $300,speeding
when droppingoff or pickingup drugsas$100,andrevealingsecretsaboutthe
organizationas$500(Adler,1995:240).
Gangs and the Drug Industry
Organizedgangactivitywere closelylinked to the heroin epidemicthathit
Detroit duringthe late1970sandearly1980s(Mieczkowski,1986).The tra-
ditional"dopepad"systemof drugdistributionin which afIXedlocationfunc-
tionedasa "retailcenter"for narcoticswasreplacedby the"runner"method.
The runnersystemwasintendedto takethenarcoticsto thecustomers(street
corners,frontofshops,parks,andcurbside).Street-levelsalesof heroinwereco-
ordinatedusingthequasibureaucraticstyleof Young BoysIncorporated(YBI).
Accordingto Mieczkowski (1986),"the runnersystemis a multi-tiered,task-
directedorganizationsystemwhichservesaheroinconsumingclientele"(648).




imperativesstrictly forbadethe regularuseof "hard" drugssuchasheroin.
YBI's systemofherQinsaleswashighlyorganizedandverylucrative.8
There issomeindicationthattheinfluenceof theYBI organizationcontin-
uedw11encrackmadeitswayintoDetroit'sdrugmarket(Phillips,1991).How-
ever,researchinto Detroit's gangmarketcontradictsthis claim.Mieczkowski
(1990)arguedthatthedynamicsof Detroit'scrackmarketweredecidedlydif-
ferentthantheheroin market.Detroit'scrackmarket,at leastthe earlycrack








with Adler's(1995)accountof thetwo drugorganizationsrun by the Cham-
bersbrothers.Adler'saccountrevealsthatthebrothersoperatedin the eastern
partof Detroit, andgenerallyrestrictedtheirhousesto a relativelysmallgeo-
graphicarea.Although the Chambersweremajorplayersin the crackmarket
at the time,thereremainedlocalcompetitionby otherreasonablybig dealers
suchasWhite Boy Rick Wershe,FrankUsher,SealMurray,andMaseratiRick
Carter.
Assessing the Prevalence and Characteristics
of Contemporary Gangs in Detroit
It is difficultto geta completepictureof contemporarygangsin Detroit. First,







The NationalYouth GangSurvey(NYGS) wasinstitutedby the Office of
JuvenileJusticeandDelinquencyPreventiontoassesstheextentof gangsin var-
iousjurisdictionsaroundthe nation.This surveyof law enforcementofficials




reportedtotalnumberof activegangmembers.The totalnumberof reported
activegangmembersincreasedfrom 2,000in 1996to 3,500in 1997,andthen
decreasedprecipitouslyin 1998to 800.The 1996and1997figures,however,
areconsistentwith thoseof othercitiesof similarsize.For example,citieswith
populationsover250,000reportedanaverageof 5,894activegangmembersin




troit areintimatelyconnectedto the drug industry.Datafrom the 1996sur-












13,3 12, 71 8754
SOURCE: D troit Police Department.
There is a well-establishedrelationshipbetweeninvolvementin gangsand
criminalactivity.One studyof gangsin ClevelandandColumbus,Ohio re-
portedthatgangmemberswereheavilyinvolvedin violentandpropertycrime
(Huff, 1989).While thefrequencyof criminaloffensesdecreasedwith these-




mostlikely associatedwith gangactivity.We refinedour definition of gang-
relatedcrimesto includetheabove-specifiedcategoriesthatinvolvedtheuseof
firearms.While not perfect,theuseof thesecategoriesis consistentwith find-
ingsfrom previousgangresearch.
Figure 9.1 demonstratesa downwardtrendin the total numberof gun-
relatedcrimesin Detroitbetween1995and1999.Gun-relatedcrimesdecreased
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SOURCE: Detroit Police Department.
~Murder, robbery,aggravated assault,and weapon offenses.
FIGURE 9.1 Gun-Related Crime* in Detroit (1995-1999)
Table9.2 Numberof Gun-RelatedCrimesin Detroit,
1995-1999,byType
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in theMidwest.Statisticsfrom 1997indicatedthatapproximately50 percent9
of youthgangswereinvolvedin streetsalesof narcotics,aswere45 percent10
of youthgangsin theMidwest (OJJDP, 1999:23).Additionally,the1997un-
weightedaverageof youthgangsfromtheMidwestinvolvedin thedistribution
of drugswasapproximately35 percent,and37percentfor citieswith popula-
tionsover250,000.
Datacollectedfor theArresteeDrug AbuseMonitoring (ADAM) program
is anotherimportantsourceof dataon the relationshipbetweengangs,drugs,
andcrime.lI Approximately12 percentof individualsinterviewedin Detroit
between1995and 1997reportedtheywerea memberof a gangeitherpres-
ently or atsomepoint in their past.Although methodologrcalconsiderations










tory evidencesuggestinggreaterabuseof illegalsubstancesby gangmembers,
reportedtheuseandsaleof drugswasconsiderablyhigheramongself-reported
gangmembers.12Although no significantdifferenceswerefound in levelsof
substanceabuseamonggangandnon-gangmembers,ADAM datadid reveal
importantdifferencesrelatingto patternsin gun use.
Approximately25 percentof ADAM respondentsin Detroit who reported
gangmembershipsaidtheyhadstolena gunfor personaluseatsomepoint in
theirpastcomparedto7percentfornon-gangmembers.Moreover,nearlyone-
quarterof self-reportedgangmembersindicatedtheyhadsoldor tradedastolen
gun in thepast,comparedto just 7 percentof non-gangmembers.Basedon
thesefindings,it is not surprisingthatself-reportedgangmembersweresig-
nificantlymorelikely to carrygunsthannon-gangmembers:Thirteenpercent
of gangmembersreportedtheycarriedgunsmostor all of the timecompared
to 4 percentof non-gangmembers.
specialeventsandsituationsrequiringintensivepolicingefforts.For instance,
officersfrom theSCS were frequentlyusedasa high-visibilitysecurityforce
duringparadesandfestivals.Interviewswith officersindicatedthat,at times,
their "on call" statuswasdetrimentalto maintainingintensiveganginvestiga-
tion andenforccment.
Threeprincipleswereatthecoreof Detroit'sAGI efforts.First,grantfunds
supportedthedevelopmentofanewunitwithin theSCS thatwould focusonly
on gang-relatedcrimeanddisorder.Second,the project'recognizedthe need
for geographicintegrity,or concentratinginterventioneffortsin an identified





staffarguedit wouldbe necessaryto drawon the knowledgeandexpertiseof





cinctsinto a new unit calledthe GangSpecialistUnit (GSU).
The partnershipbetweenthe SCS andpatrolofficersservedseveralfunc-
tions.Officerswho werepreviouslyassignedasprecinctpatrolofficersprovided
anin-depthunderstat1dingof thenatureof crimein eachof the two precincts,
knowledgeof actualoffenders,includinggangmembers,knowledgeof themain
geographiclocationsof gang-relatedactivity,andknowledgeof and contact





edgeof gangsandknowledgeof theparticularlocationsof gangactivity.
Policing researchcontinuesto debatetheefficacyof centralizedversusde-
centralizedpolicingfunctions.Aswith resultsfromothercities,therehavebeen
bothpositiveandnegativeconsequencesto thistraditionalcentralizedenforce-
mentunit. Centralizationcanbe usefulto gatherintelligence,coordinatein-
tensiveefforts,andensureuniformity.In situationswheredangerispotentially
imminentandcontrolis desired,centralizedcommandstructurescanbe effec-
tiveto gaincompliance(Bayley,1994).Earlierin thechapterwe detailedchar-




in policedepartmentstendto be basedon day-to-dayinteractionswith indi-
vidualsfromone'simmediatework group.When andif conflictarisesbetween
variouscomponentsof an organization,individualstendto view the conflict
.1
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increase,bringingthelevelscloseto thoseof 1995.Although thenumbersof
murder,robbery,andweaponoffensesexperiencedsimilartrends,increasesbe-
tween 1997and1998werenot largeenoughto nullifY thedownwardtrend.
Thus, between1995and1999the rateof gun-involvedcrimesin Detroit ex-
hibiteda considerabledecline.
Gangs in Detroit: Conclusion
These data,in conjunctionwith the historicalobservationsmadeby Taylor
(1990),clearlyindicatethatgangsposeasignificantproblcmin thecity of De-
troit. Although thereis someevidencethatcontemporarygangsarenot asor-
ganizedasin thedaysof YoungBoysIncorporatedandtheChambersbrothers,
thisdoesnotsuggestheneteffectsof theiractionsareanylessserious.The de-
centralizationof gangsmaybe associatedwith moreratherthanlessviolence.
Descriptionsof Detroit'sgangsby Taylor(1990)andAdler(1995)suggestspe-
cific organizationalstructureswith fairly elaboratecommunicationchannels.
One would assumethecommunicationchannelsincludedcleardirectivesasto
"ownership"of particularterritories.Sincea sizableamountof gangviolence
is associatedwith establishingterritorial rightsandwith generalcompetition
betweenvariousgangs(DeckerandVan Winkle, 1996),thecurrentlackof a
highlyorganizedstructurecouldresultin anincreasinglyunstabledrugmarket
whereviolenceismore likely.Whatevertheeventualeffectof thesestructural
changesin gangsin Detroit overthepast15 years,datafrom theNYGS and
!\DAM programindicatethatgangmemberscontinueto be heavilyinvolved




Detroit wasone of 15citiesselectedto participatein theAnti-Gang Initiative
(AGI) fundedthroughtheU.S. Departmentof Justice, Office of Community
OrientedPolicing Services(COPS). The COPS officetargetedgrantfunding
to citieswith establishedandchronicproblemswith gangsandcrime.The pur-
poseof theAGI programwastofosterthedevelopmentof innovativeandcom-
prehensivestrategiesto combatgang-related isorderin severalcommunities
throughoutthenation,
Organizational Structure and Gang Enforcement
Officersfrom theDetroit Police Department'sSpecialCrimes Section(SCS)
havetraditionallymaintainedresponsibilitiesforgatheringgangintelligenceand
targetinggangsandgang-relatedcrimesin thecity.Although theprimaryre-
sponsibilityof theSCS is to providea uniform effortto combatgang-related
crime,its officersalsoservean "on call" functionwheretheyareutilizedfor
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In general,thegang>in the targetprecinctscanbe characterizedasquasi-
scavengergangs.As describedby Taylor (1990),scavengergangsarelikely to
belooselyorganizedwith no clearorganizationalstructure.However, thereis
somelevelof organizationamongthesegan"gs.The HeadbangersandLatin
Counts, for example,werereportedto havesmallergroupswith expertisein
burglary,robbery,or drugsales.This characterizationis consistentwith Tay-








andTaylor,1999;SpergelandCurry, 1990).A surveyof 254law enforcement
agenciesaroundthenatiDnindicatedsuppressionstrategieswere theprimary
methodusedby law enforcementagenciesto combatgang-relateddisorder
(DeckerandCurry, 2000:565).






carareas."Hot spotsfor gangactivitywithin eachprecinctwereidentifiedfrom
crimeanalysisandgangintelligence.Targetingscout-carareasmadepossiblea
moresubstantialimpacton asmallergeographicalarea,therebyconcentrating
theeffectivenessof thestrategy.The suppressioneffortalsoincorporateda hy-
brid of theintensivesupervisionapproachusedby theBostonPolice Depart-
mentfor OperationNight Light, which targetedviolentjuvenile offenders.
The BostonPolice Departmentreceivednationalacclaimfor its effortsto
proactivelyintervenewith violent youth crime (BostonPolice Department,
1996).Under its Youth ViolenceStrike Force (YVSF), Boston implemented
severalprograms,includingOperationNight Light, OperationCeasefire,and
theBostonGun Project,with the purposeof makingthe streetssaferfor the
generalcommunity.OperationNight Light wasof particularinterestto mem-
bersof theDPD becauseitspurposewasto formalizea relationshipbetween
thepoliceandprobationofficers.Membersof theDetroit Police Department
wentto Bostonto determinewhatcoreaspectsof theYVSF's effortscouldbe
integratedinto thestructureof theAnti-Gang Initiative.
Similarto OperationNightLight, theDPD establishedacooperativeagree-
mentwith theMichigan Departmentof Correctionsto performjoint opera-
tionsfor thepurposeof targetinggangmembersin thetargetareas.The pro-
bationofficersparticipatedin monthlyride-alongswith membersof the Gang
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from theperspectiveof theirunit (EisensteinandJacob, 1977).In policeorga-
nizations,strongrivalriescanalsoarisethatnot only createanunhealthylevel
of competitionbetweenunits,butalsocanimpedeeffectivecompletionofjob
activities.DPD commandstafffeltthestrategyof integratingmembersof the
SCS with precinctpatrolofficerswould helpalleviateproblemswith interunit
competition,which accordingto interviewswith policeofficerswaspreviously
a problemin Detroit.
Gangs in the Target Precincts
Gangactivityin theFourth andNinth Precinctswasin somewayssimilarand
in othersverydifferent.The Headbangersgangis composedprimarilyof Afri-
canAmericansandtendsto controlasignificantamountof theterritoryin the
Ninth Precinct.This gangdoesnot appearto be organized~ith anydefinitive
structure,but theircriminalactivitiestendto be somewhatmorecoordinated
thanthoseof othergangs.In general,however,theHeadbangersgangis com-
posedof looselyaffiliatedgangsidentifiedby theircontrolovercertainstreets.
Thesevariousgangstendto unifYmostlywhen confrontingacommonenemy,
suchasan outsidegangattemptingto takeover their territory.This typeof
looseallianceissimilarto thatexplainedby Spergel(1964:64),in whichwhite
ethnic gangswould occasionallyjoin forcesto battleAfrican American or
PuertoRican gangs.Comparedto othergangsin Detroit, theHeadbangersare
morediscretein how theydisplaytheir"colors,"or identifYingsymbols uchas
clothingorjewelry.Gangmembersoftenwearsubtleidentifierssuchasbeaded
necklaceswith blackandredbeadsor redshoelacesasinsigniasof theirmem-





In contrast,gangsin the Fourth PrecinctarepredominantlyHispanicor
multiracial.The Latin CountsandCashFlow Possearethebiggestgangsin the
precinct,andmembersof both aremuchmore likely to openlydisplay"col-
ors"or otherinsigniasof membership.This wasespeciallytrueprior totheAGI
program.In manycases,eachgangidentifiesitselfwith a particularcollegeor
professionalsportsteamandadoptsthe team'scolor schemeandclothingfor
theirgang_For example,membersof theCashFlow Posseareidentifiedby their
traditionof wearingUniversityof North Carolina sportsclothing.Non-gang
membersliving in activegangareasarelikely to not weartheseclothinglines
becauseof thecommonperceptionthattheclothesdenotegangmembership.
Fourth Precinctgangsaremoreterritorialthanthosein theNinth Precinct.
Gangdisputesoftenresultfrom perceivedoutsidersattemptingto controlpar-
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aszero-tolerancecurfewpoliciesarebeingimplementedatunprecedentedrates
(RuefleandReynold,1995),researchcontinuestofindthatthesestrategieshave
only mixed resultsin deterringcrime. Dallasreportedsomepositiveresults
from aggressivecurfewand truancyenforcement,yetMcDowall, Loftin, and
Wiersema(2000),in theirstudyof theinstitutionof acurfewordinance,found
no significantdifferencesin pre- andpostinterventionviolentcrimerates.This
studyissomewhatlimitedin thatit comparesratesbeforeandaftertheinstitu-




of assistantprosecutorshandlingone criminal complaintfrom startto finish
throughtheentirecourtprocess.In contrast,horizontalprose'cutionis anor-
ganizationalstructurestrategywherebyindividualassistantprosecutorsor a






crimes(Johnson,Webster,and Connors, 1995).The WayneCounty Prose-
cutor'sOffice designateda prosecutorto actasa liaisonto the gangunit and
overseeall gang-relatedprosecutions.This wasa substantialchangefrom the
waygang-relatedcriminalprosecutionswerehandledprior to the Anti-Gang
Initiative.
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Intervention Strategies





of opportunity(Anderson,1999;Decker andCurry, 2000;Decker andVan
Winkle, 1996;GoldsteinandGlick, 1994;Taylor, 1990;Thrasher,1936).To




(GoldsteinandGlick, 1994)to providingsafeplacesfor at-risk youth to par-
ticipatein recreationalactivities(ThurmanetaI., 1996).
The interventioneffortsof membersof the GangSpecialistUnit encom-
passedelementsof bothpreventionandintervention.Information-basedtacti-
caldeploymentstrategieswerevitalto theeffectivenessof theDPD's Anti-Gang
Initiative.Directedaggressivepatroltechniquesin "hotspots,"smallgeographic
areaswith highlevelsof crimeandcommunitydisorder,haveproveneffective
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SpecialistUnit, togethertargetingsuspectedgangmembersto determineif
theywere abidingbi the conditionsof their parole/probation.Listsof sus-
pectedgangmemberswereprovidedtoprobationandparoleofficers,who sub-
sequentlyreturnedthe list with informationrelevantto the Departmentof
Corrections.These teamsvisitedindividualstargetedfor interventionduring
ride-alongsthat involvedsearchesof the individualsand location.Probation
revocationpetitionswerefiledfor individualsfound to be in violationof their
probationconditions.Violationsusuallyinvolveduseof proscribedsubstances
suchasalcoholor illegalnarcotics,contactwith restrictedindividuals,'orspend-







port to theNationalInstituteofJusticeindicatedthat60percentof participants
in fourmiddleschoolsin Detroit reportedtheirschoolwaslocatedin gangter-
ritories, 41 percentreportedtheysometimesfelt unsafeatschool,95 percent
reportedtheyhadwitnessedacrimein thepasttwomonths,and66percentre-
portedtheywitnessedastudentwith aweaponatschool (BynumetaI., 1998:
73-76).
Officersfrom theGangSpecialistUnit regularly(atleastonceaweek)vis-
ited schools(usuallymiddleschools)in thetargetareas.During eachvisit,of-
ficerswould speakbriefly with schooladministratorsandsecuritypersonnel
to inquireaboutproblembehavior.Officersregularlyquestionedindividuals
hangingaroundtheperimeterof theschoolduringschoolhours,andoftenar-
restedpersonsillegallyon schoolgroundsfor trespassingand/or truancy.GSU
officersspentconsiderabletime informallytalkingwith studentswhile they
were in school.They would sometimestargetthe schoolsimmediatelyafter








led into thesocialinterventionapproachof the1940sand1950s.Subsequently,
asconcernaboutdelinquencyrosein the 1960s,the opportunities-basedap-
proachdevelopedwith theintentof increasingeconomicopportunitiesfor im-
poverishedindividuals.Finally,theauthorsargued,asneighborhoodresources




a sustained,long-termimpacton crime.Although suppressionstrategiesuch
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in both KansasCity and Minneapolis(ShermanandRogan, 1995;Sherman
andWeisburg,1995).Maintaininggeographicassignmentsin both theFourth
andNinth Precinctsremaineda centralfocusthroughoutthedurationof the




ancy,public consumptionof alcohol,and gamblingin public (for example,
shootingdice).AGI officersalsoutilizedaggressivenforcementof trafficlaws,










Open communicationwith the communitywasimportantto this initia-




relationships.From thebeginningof thedevelopmentof theprogram,theDe-










assistedthemwith homeworkor simplyspenttimewith themon weekends.
The officersreportedthatmentoringwaspersonallyrewardingandhelpedthem
keepin touchwith childrenliving in theircommunities.
The Anti-Gang Initiativeattemptedto developa comprehensiveapproach














effectivenessof theprograrrin decreasingang-relatedcrimein thetwo target
precincts.It wasimportanttoselectanadditionalprecinctnotsubjectto thein-
terventionasa comparisonarea.Basedon consultationwith SCS administra-




The evaluationusedfour primary datasources:weeklyarrestsummaries
preparedby theGSU sergeantsresponsiblefor eachprojectprecinct,policeof-
fenseandarrestdata,fieldnotesfrom observationperiods,andinterviewswith
GSU officers.At the onsetof the program,eachsergeantmaintainedweekly
logs thatidentifiedeachweek'stargetneighborhoodand detailedall arrests
madeby theofficers.This informationwasimportantbecausetheinformation
systemcouldnot extracttheexactarrestsmadeby membersof the GangSpe-
cialistUnit. Thesedatawereusedto quantifYtheofficers'activity.15An analysis
wasalsoconductedof Detroit'scriminaloffenseandarrestdatabetween1995
and1998.Thesedatawereutilizedto revealcrimepatternsfor the targetand
comparisondistrict,includingtheextentof gang-relatedandgun-relatedinci-
dents.Additionally,theevaluationteamusedobservationstrategiesto observe
the tacticsandstrategiesemployedby membersof the Gang SpecialistUnit.
These ride-alongswereimportantbecausetheyprovidedan opportunityfor
technicalassistancewith refiningtheprogrammodelandfor assessingthe ex-
tentto which manyof thesuppressionandinterventionstrategieswereopera-
tionalized.Finally,interviewswereconductedwith eachmemberof theGSU.
The interviewersoughtofficers'opinionsaboutthecharacteristicsof gangsin
theFourth andNinth Precincts,theeffectivenessof theAG [ modelin achiev-
ing programgoals,theextentof problemsassociatedwith theimplementation
of theprogram,andsuggestedmodificationsto theprogramdesign.
It is importantto once againnote thatit wasdifficult to determinegang-
relatedcriminalincidentsfromDetroit'sincidentdata.Gang-relatedoffensesare
not amongDetroit'scrimeclassifications.The decisionwasmadeto usenon-
domesticgun-relatedcrimesasproximalmeasuresofgangcrimes.As notedear-
lier, prior researchindicatesgangmembersaresubstantiallymorelikely to use
firearmsin thecommissionof crimes.Althoughofficersindicatedin interviews
thatgangmembersin theFourth Precinctweremuchlesslikely to carry fire-
. armswhen comparedto gangmembersin the Ninth, theydid report thata
.1
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substantialportionof gun-relatedcrimesin theFourthareattributableto gang
members.Thus, we areconfidentthatgun-relatedcrimesrepresenta conser-






This strategyprovideda comprehensivebody of knowledgeaboutthenature
andcharacteristicsof gangsandotherdelinquentgroupsin certainlocations.
AGI officersaggressivelyenforcedwhat are commonlyrefer·redto as"order
maintenance"violations.Althoughnot criminal,ordermaintenanceviolations
suchascurfew,truancy,littering,loitering,publicgambling,andpublicurina-
tion provideadditionalopportunitiesfor officersto prohibit or curtailquality




The weeklysummariescollectedby eachsergeantwerecompiledfor 1997,
the first full yearof the AGI. Table9.3 detailsthe totalnumberof arrestsby
crimetypefor eachprecinct.During theinterventionperiod,theFourth Pre-
cinctreportedatotalof 475arrests.The majorityof arrestswerefor disorderly











canbe heavilyinfluencedby officers'discretionastowhen to invoketheirau-




in arrestfrequencies,especiallyfor drugarrests,mightbeafunctionof enforce-
menttactics.As notedpreviously,weaponswereviewedastheprincipalprob-
lem in theNinth Precinct.Correspondingly,theNinth Precinct crewswere
morelikely tomakeweaponsarrests.Similarly,drugswerereportedtobeama-
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Table 9.3 Arrests by Crime Type (Intervention Period) FOURTHPRECINCT























"'Includ smurder.robbery, rape,and assault.
t Includesarson, larceny,maliciousdestruction of property, posses5ionof a stolen motor vehicle. receivingand con-
cealing, and retail fraud.
SOURCE: Detroit Police Department(weeklysummaries).
Table 9.4 Reported Incidents (Fourth Quarter 1996
























causetheymeasurelevelsof crimejust prior to programimplementationand
atthepointwheremostof thecomponentsof theprogramhadbeenfully im-
the interventionperiod. Gun-relatedcrime decreasedprecipitouslyin the
Ninth Precinctfromahighof nearly300in Decemberof 1996to nearly100in
March of 1997.Similarly,gun-relatedcrimesgenerallydecreasedin theFourth
Precinctduringtheinterventionperiod,thoughincreasingmoderatelytoward
thelatterstagesof theinitiative.Finally,figuresfor theEighth Precinctdo not
revealsimilarpatterns,but indicatethateffectsof seasonalitywere consistent
throughoutthestudyperiod.
The purposeof time-seriesanalysisis to determineif fluctuationsin the
trendspresentedin Figure9.2area functionof trendsthatwould haveother-
wisebeenmanifestabsentheAGI intervention,andalsoto control for theef-
fectsof seasonalityon thelikelihoodof gun-relatedcrime.For theNinth Pre-
cinct, trendsin gun-relatedcrimeweresignificantlylower after'theinitiation
of theAnti-Gang Initiativethanotherwisewouldbeexpectedbasedon prein-
terventiontrends.The model,fittingthe ARIMA (1,0,0)model anddemon-
stratinganerror structurewithoutsignificantautocorrelation(Q >.05)(Mc-
Dowall eta!.,1980),andcontrollingfor theeffectsof seasonality,suggestedthe
intensiveeffortsin the Ninth Precinctreducedgun-relatedactivityby anesti-
mated112crimespermonth.
The impactof theAGI wasnot statisticallysignificantin the Fourth Pre-
cinct (0,1,1ARIMA model)asit wasthe Ninth Precinct (Q <.05).Because
gun-relatedcrimeisararereventin theFourthPrecinctthanin both theNinth
andEighthPrecincts,it isplausiblethe null finding is anartifactof thesmaller






interventionperiod werenot significant(Q <.05),suchcrimesdid decrease




The frequencyof reportedcrimedecreasedremarkablyin both theFourth
andNinth Precinctsduringtheprojectperiod.The mostsubstantialdecrease
in reportedcrimewasfor gun-relatedassaults,anastounding65percentin the
Fourth Precinctand72 percentin theNinth Precinct.Betweenthe two pre-
cincts,thefigurerepresentsadecreaseof over300gunassaults.Both experimen-
tal precinctsalsorecordeda substantialdecreasein all assaultsand robberies.
Robberiesin theNinth Precinctdecreasedover80 percent,representinga de-
creasefrom 589in the fourthquarterof 1996to 271in thefourth quarterof
1997.Similarly,robberiesin theFourth Precinctdecreasedby 50 percent,re-
sultingin 70fewerrobberyvictims.Althoughburglariesdecreasedin both tar-
getprecincts,homicidesdecreasedonly in the Fourth Precinct(50 percent).
Once again,thesefiguresrepresenta substantialdecreasein both criminalof-
fendingandvictimizationovertheprojectperiod.
A comparisonof thereporteddecreasesin criminaloffendingin thetarget





for thetargetandcontrol areasbetweenthefourthquarterof 1996andfourth
quarterof 1997.The dataindicatethattheEighth Precinctexperiencedsub-
stantialincreasesin manyof thecrimecategories,whereasthetargetprecincts
reportedlargedecreases.Althoughthenumberof homicidesin theEighthPre-
cinct remainedsteadyat 11, noteworthyincreaseswere reportedin assaults,
burglaries,andgun-relatedassaults.Additionally,althoughtheEighthPrecinct
did experiencea 12 percentdecreasein robberies,thischangeis substantially
smallerthanwhatwasobservedfor theFourth andNinth Precincts.
The informationjust presentedsuggestsDetroit'sAnti-Gang Initiativewas
successfulin reducingthe occurrencesof gang-relatedproblems.While the
decreasesbetweenthe two quartersreportedin Table9.4 aresubstantial,the
analysisdoesnot determineif thelevelof crimeduringtheinterventionperiod
(January-December1997)wasstatisticallydifferentfrom trendsthecity was
otherwiseexperiencing.Time-seriesanalysisis a usefulstrategyfor determin-





andNinth Precincts)andthecomparisonarea(EighthPrecinct).The two ver-
tical lines demarcatethe interventionperiod,January 1997throughAugust
1998,An initial reviewof thefigureindicatesthatamongthethreeprecincts,
gun-relatedcrimewasgenerallyhigherin theNinth Precinctandlowestin the
Fourth Precinct.However,considerablevariationis evidentespeciallyduring















callfor amoreflexibleresponse.Given thenatureof thisissueandthehistory
of suchgeographicallybasedinterventionsin otherjurisdictions,thepolicede-
partmentisto becommendedfor maintainingtheintegrityof thisaspectof theintervention.
Finally,thecommunitypartnershipsandoutreachaspectsof theinterven-





of thecommunityperceiveenforcementeffortsto be carriedout in anunfair
manner.The DPD wasableto gainthecooperationof communityorganizers
by identifYinghigh-crime,gang-saturatedareas.However,involvingcommu-
nity membersmoresystematicallyby providingbriefingmaterialsaftermajor
raidsor monthlysummariesof activitiesmighthavegiventhe DPD a conduit
to garneradditionalsupport.
















9. The figureis weightedfor population
andaccountsfor thenumberof gang
membersreportedin eachjurisdiction.
10. The figureis unweightedfor
population.
11. Datawetetakenfrom theDUF Gun
Addendumthatwasadministeredbetween
1995and1997.
12. It is firstimportantto note thestudy
populationwasjuvenilesratherthanadults
asin theADAM study.












4. In 1943thepopulationof Detroit was
estimatedto beapproximately2 million.
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by 6 permonthon average.It doesnot appearthatthelimitednumberof ob-
servationswould haveplayedthe samerole in the analysisof theEighthPre-
cinctdataasit washypothesizedto playin theFourth.
The Detroit Anti-Gang Initiativelargelyrepresentedan aggressivepatroland
suppressionstrategyof enforcementin two targetprecincts.While Detroitmay
not be a typicalcity in termsof itssizeor crimepatterns,it is fairlytypicalin
itsstructureof gangs.Gangsin Detroit aremainlysmall,neighborhood-based,
andnot highlyorganizedgroups,someof which maybeconsiderablyinvolved
in weaponsuseand/or drugsales.
Over theperiodof theinterventionandoperationof the-AGIproject,there
wasa considerabledeclinein gun crimesin the targetprecincts,whereasthe
numberof suchoffensesrosein thecomparisonprecinct.This wasparticularly
the casein the Ninth Precinct,where a statisticallysignificantreductionof
gun crimesoccurred.Perhapsmore importantly,this reductionrepresented
112fewergun crimes,andthusa commensuratefewernumberof victims,per
monthin thisprecinct.Given thedesignof thisstudyandavailabledata,these
resultscannotbe directlyattributedto the intervention.However, thereis a
strongindicationthattheseaggressivepolicingtacticscontributedsignificantly
to thismeaningfulreduction.
Although the initiativewaslargelysuccessful,severalotheraspectsof the
projectwerelessproductive.There wereseveraladministrativeproblemswith
theinitiativethatlimitedtheavailabilityof equipmentandtrainingtomembers
of theGang SpecialistUnit. Under theoriginalprogramdesign,officerswere
to be giventheopportunityto attendspecializedtrainingfor gangidentifica-
tion andenforcementstrategies.Only limitedtrainingwasdelivered,andthat
wasneartheendof theinitiative.This lackoftraining,particularlyearlierin the
project,wasa continuingconcernfor manyof theGSU officers.
Officersalsoreportedproblemswith overlyrestrictivegeographicassign-
ments.The switchto a geographicallybasedprogramresultedin concentrated
effortsat reducinggang-relatedactivityin certainhot spots.Commandstaff
'continuallyreferredto crimetrendsto makeminor adjustmentsto targetloca-
tions basedon week-to-week changesin crime. However, interviewswith
membersof theGSU indicatedthatwhile manyvaluedtheideaof geographic.
responsibility,theyalsobelievedit artificiallyconstrainedtheirinvestigationsat
times.The supervisors'commitmentto thismodel restrictedthe movement
of officersto neighborhoodsthatborderedeachprecinct.Gangmembersand
otheroffendersareseldomawareof administrativeboundariesandmaymove
in andout of variouspoliceboundariesastheirsocialor criminalrelationships
change.This representsacontinuingdilemmain policingbetweenmaintaining
the integrityof the interventionthroughrulesspecifYinggeographicassign-
mentandatthesametimerecognizingthatthenatureof thegangsmayattimes
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INTRODUCTION
Civil ganginjunctions(CGIs) area legaltool for addressingthehold thaten-
trenchedgangshaveon urbanneighborhoods.Unlike somelaw enforcement
ganginterventionstrategiesthatfocuson individualsor gangswithout regard
to place,CGIs arespatiallybased,neighborhood-levelinterventionsintended
to disruptagang'sroutineactivities.As severalpoliceofficersandattorneyshave





The CGI assertsthatasanunincorporatedassociation,a ganghasengaged
in criminalandotheractivitiesthatconstituteapublicnuisance.Specificmem-
bersareliablefor civil actionasaconsequenceof theirmembershipin theasso-
ciation.The useof injunctionsagainstgangswaspioneeredasearlyas1980,but
only since1993hasthestrategybecomewidespreadin LosAngelesandSouth-
ern California.The acceleratedusereflectstheperceivedsuccessesof injunc-
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